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Francesca Forlè (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele)

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Embodied Affectivity. A Phenomenological Account of the Connection between Affective Phenomena and Bodily Expressions

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Friday, 24 October 2025

10:15am ET, 3:15pm GMT+1, 4:15pm CET

 

Abstract: In this talk, I will deal with the relationship between affective experiences and bodily expressions. In contemporary embodied constitution theories of affectivity (Kruger 2020, Overgaard 2012), bodily expressions are argued to be constitutive parts of affective phenomena. Pro­ponents of these theories often criticize the idea that bodily expressions are merely caused by the expressed affective experiences, but then they have the problem of accommodating the intuition that an affective experience somehow brings about its bodily expressions. Here, I will propose a way out of this issue, maintaining that we can accommodate this intuition without giving up the embodied constitution account of affective experiences. To do so, I will introduce the idea of a motivational connection between affective experiences and their bodily expressions (Husserl 1952, Stein 1917), also showing how such a connection can adequately account for crucial aspects of the phenomenon of bodily expressivity.

  

James Kinkaid (Bilkent University)

Husserlian Idealism and the Identity Theory of Truth

28 November 2025

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Abstract: Correspondence theories of truth distinguish between truth-bearers—propositions—and the truth-makers—facts or states of affairs—to which they correspond. Identity theories reject this distinction and hold that true propositions are identical to facts. I argue that Husserl’s transition from the realism and triadic analysis of intentionality of the Logical Investigations to the transcendental idealism and dyadic analysis of intentionality of Ideas is also a transition from a correspondence theory to an identity theory of truth. Drawing on Gurwitsch’s interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, I then sketch an idealist identity theory and contrast it with other identity theories on offer.

 

Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani (University of Neuchâtel)

Adolf Reinach's Theory of Social Acts: Illuminating Debates on Joint and Collective Intentionality

5 December 2025

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Abstract: In The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law (1913), Reinach develops his theory of social acts by (i) characterizing them as acts of mind that are in need of being heard, and (ii) arguing that they are governed by essential laws—a priori truths grounded in the very essence of such acts. On Reinach’s account, social institutions come into existence through mechanisms of social interaction subject to essential laws and indeed presuppose the validity of these laws for their very possibility. My aim in this talk is to reframe current debates on joint and collective intentionality, in part by drawing on these two core aspects of Reinach’s theory. First, I characterize second-personal acts as those that require joint attitudes for their possibility, and I argue that Reinachian social acts are second-personal in this sense. By distinguishing between oughts that arise from second-personal acts qua second-personal engagements and oughts attached to specific statuses within the institutional world, I then suggest that certain obligations can belong to the latter category without being dependent on human attitudes—that is, by pertaining to essential laws in the Reinachian sense

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Pascale Roure (Yildiz Technical University) and Emre Şan (University of Istanbul 29 Mayis)

Phenomenology in Turkey

16 January 2026

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Abstract: This presentation on phenomenology in Turkey consists in two distinct parts. The first part examines the early reception of phenomenology in the first decades of the Republic of Turkey. In this section, Pascale Roure shows that interest in phenomenology emerged in the context of the Turkish university reform and was closely associated with the development of academic exchanges with Germany during the late 1920s and 1930s. Despite the presence at Istanbul University of Ernst von Aster, whose work highlighted the diversity of the phenomenological movement, this political context shaped an understanding of phenomenology that leaned towards philosophical anthropology. This conception was based on a reading of Max Scheler by a new generation of philosophers trained in Germany during this period, such as Mazhar Şevket İpşiroğlu and Takiyettin Mengüşoğlu. The latter, a disciple of Nicolai Hartmann, devoted himself to the transition from phenomenology to an ontologically founded philosophical anthropology, which dominated the field of Turkish academic philosophy until the end of the 1950s. Regardless of this trend, interest in phenomenology was renewed in the second half of the 20th century, notably in connection with a focus on French-speaking authors and their reading of Husserl and Heidegger. In the second part, Emre Şan presents later developments of phenomenology in Turkey, including the translation of key phenomenological works in the last twenty years, and the genuine contribution to the field of phenomenological studies in Turkish academia, institutionally reflected in the increase of theses and in the recent establishment of the Turkish Society for Phenomenology (Türkiye Fenomenoloji Topluluğu).

 

Benoit Guilielmo (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Exploring the Essence of Bullshit through Early Phenomenology (Kolnai and Hildebrand)

20 February 2026

 

Abstract: The target question of this talk is: What is the essence of bullshitting? After briefly presenting the two main contemporary theoretical approaches to bullshitting, I argue—drawing on value theory in realist phenomenology, particularly Kolnai and von Hildebrand—that bullshitting is not merely a violation of epistemic standards but an attitude that rejects the values grounding those standards. On this view, bullshitting is not only an epistemic failure but an axiological one, rooted in a negative stance toward cognitive values. This account clarifies why bullshit is essentially phony and why indifference to truth is central to it.

 

Lorenza D'Angelo (Pompeu Fabra University)

Pleasure, Pain and Introspection

6 March 2026

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Abstract:  This talk advances a phenomenological account of the nature of pleasure and pain. In §1, I ask whether there are any experiential features unifying all pleasure and all pain, and, if so, whether we can introspect them. In §2, I defend the view that any pleasure is such in virtue of the fact that it feels good (it has a conscious positive valence) while any suffering is such in virtue of the fact that it feels bad (it has a conscious negative valence). In §3, I argue that these experiential features are non-sensory. My argument draws on recent work in the philosophy of mind: I first explain what conditions must be met in order for a mental feature to count as sensory, and I then show that valence does not meet these conditions. In §4, I draw some conclusions concerning introspection.

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Mohammed Saleh Zarepour (University of Manchester)

Revisiting Ibn Sīnā’s Account of Intentionality

24 April 2026

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Abstract: According to Ibn Sīnā’s representationalist account of intentionality, perception (idrāk)—i.e., the most general representative of human cognitive activities—is primarily entertaining a mental representation, which itself is an affection of a form on the soul. To perceive (or to think about) an extramental existent is to entertain a mental representation of that existent. The subject is related to the extramental existent only indirectly and through a mental representation that shares the same essence as that existent. The direct objects of our thoughts are mental representations because, otherwise, Ibn Sīnā believes, the possibility of thinking about non-existents cannot be explained. The phenomenal (or subjective similarity) between non-empty and empty thoughts (e.g., between seeing an apple and hallucinating it) is grounded in the presence of similar representations in both cases (e.g., similar mental representations of an apple), even though the mechanisms of producing representations in non-empty and empty cases are different. At first glance, this account of intentionality might seem implausible because it implies that there are essences that can be instantiated once as a substance existing in the extramental realm and once as a mental representation of that substance, which is an affection on the soul and thus an accident. However, this apparent tension can be resolved by appealing to additional principles regarding substantiality or predication, which can be derived from Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy.

 

Sebastian Watzl (University of Oslo)

Attention Norms and Frames. On the Social Organisation of Experience

8 May 2026